Publications sorted by year
n Oblivious dynamic mechanism design. (With Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo). Working paper. PDF.
n How to manipulate truthful prior-dependent mechanisms? (With Yulong Zeng). Working Paper. PDF.
n Optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts. (With Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo). Working paper. PDF
n Coalition manipulations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. (With Yuan Deng, Weiran Shen). Working paper. PDF.
n Inapproximability of barter exchanges with cycle length constraints. (With Suiqian Luo, Chenggang Wu, Jianyang Zeng) Working paper. PDF.
n Optimal mechanisms with simple menus. (with Zihe Wang), Journal of Mathematical economics, 2017. PDF
n Unit-sphere games. (With Hanrui Zhang) International Journal of Game Theory, 2017. PDF.
n Practical versus optimal mechanisms. (With Weiran Shen), AAMAS-2017. PDF.
n Efficient near-optimal algorithms for barter exchange. (With Zhipeng Jia, Ruosong Wang, Hanrui Zhang). AAMAS-2017. PDF
n Stability of generalized two-sided markets with transaction thresholds. (With Wei Zhan, Zhiyuan Li, Yicheng Liu). AAMAS-2017. PDF.
n K-memory strategies in repeated games. (With Lijie Chen, Fangzhen Lin, Kangning Wang, Shiheng Wang, Ruosong Wang). AAMAS-2017 Extended abstract.
n Fans economy and all-pay auctions with proportional allocations. (With Yulong Zeng, Song Zuo). AAAI-2017. PDF.
u Fans economy, community economy, internet monetization
n Computational issues in time-inconsistent planning. (With Yifeng Teng, Zihe Wang, Shengke Xiao, Yichong Xu). AAAI-2017. PDF.
n Optimal commitments in auctions with incomplete information. (with Zihe Wang, Michael Zhang) ACM EC-2016. PDF.
n Optimal auctions for negatively correlated items. (With Zihe Wang) ACM EC-2016. PDF.
n Dynamic auctions with bank accounts. (With Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo). IJCAI -2016. New York. USA. PDF.
n Digital good exchanges. (With Wenyi Fang, Song Zuo). IJCAI -2016. New York. USA. PDF.
n Facility location with minimax envy. (With Qingpeng Cai, Aris-Filos Ratsikas). IJCAI -2016. New York. USA. PDF.
n Mechanism design for personalized recommender systems. (With Qingpeng Cai, Aris-Filos Ratsikas, Chang Liu) ACM Recsys-2016. PDF.
n Efficient mechanism design for online scheduling. (With Bo Zheng et. al.). Journal of AI Research (JAIR). 2016. PDF.
n Complexity and algorithms of K-implementation. (With Yuan Deng, Shuran Zheng). AAMAS-2016. Singapore, PDF.
n On the power of dominated players in team competitions. (With Kai Jin, Shiteng Chen). AAMAS-2016. Singapore, PDF.
n Online non-preemptive story scheduling in web advertising. (With Tie-Yan Liu, Weidong Ma, Tao Qin, Guang Yang, Bo Zheng). AAMAS-2016, Singapore, PDF.
n Digital good exchange. (With Wenyi Fang, Song Zuo) Extended abstract AAMAS-2016. PDF
n Discrete action spaces cause little loss in single-item auctions. (With Yicheng Liu) Extended abstract AAMAS-2016. PDF
n Optimizing trading assignments in water right markets. (With Yicheng Liu, Tingting Xu, Hang Zheng) AAAI-2016. Phoenix, USA. PDF.
n Mechanism design and implementation for lung exchange. (with Suiqian Luo) IJCAI-2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina. PDF. Media press paper. Top 4 out of 575
n Optimal auctions for partially rational bidders. (with Zihe Wang) IJCAI-2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina. PDF.
n Mechanism design for resource allocation with applications to centralized multi-commodity routing. (with Qipeng Liu, Yicheng Liu) Extended abstract, AAMAS-2015, Istanbul, Turkey. Full version.
n Bounded rationality of restricted Turing machines. (with Lijie Chen), Extended abstract AAMAS-2015, Istanbul, Turkey. Full version.
n Optimal machine strategy to commit to in two-person repeated games. (with Song Zuo). AAAI-2015, Austin, USA. PDF
n Randomized assignments for barter exchanges: fairness vs. efficiency. (With Wenyi Fang, Aris Filos-Ratskas, Soren Stiil-Fredriksen, Song Zuo). ADT-2015. PDF.
n Optimal mechanisms with simple menus. (with Zihe Wang), ACM EC-2014. Palo Alto, USA.
n Internally stable matchings and exchanges. (with Yicheng Liu and Wenyi Fang). AAAI-2014. Quebec City, Canada. PDF.
Invited talk at Informs-14
n The multi-shop ski rental problem. (With Lingqing Ai, Xian Wu, Lingxiao Huang, Longbo Huang, Jian Li). ACM Sigmetrics-2014. Austin, USA. PDF.
n Egalitarian Pair-wise Kidney Exchange: Fast Algorithms via Linear Programming and Parametric Flow. (With Jian Li, Yicheng Liu, Lingxiao Huang). AAMAS-2014. Paris, France. PDF.
n Mechanism design for route allocation in multiple-commodity network. (With Qipeng Liu and Yicheng Liu). AAMAS-2014. Paris, France. PDF.
n Computational economics and optimal mechanism design. (in Chinese) Communication of CCF, 2013. PDF.
n Bayesian vote manipulation: optimal strategies and impact on welfare. (with Craig Boutilier, Tyler Lu, Ariel Procaccia), UAI-2012, Catalina Island, US. PDF
n Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders. (With Tuomas Sandholm). AAAI-2012, July, Toronto, Canada. PDF.
n Coalitional Structure of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem. (With Tuomas Sandholm). CoopMas-2012, June, Valencia, Spain. PDF.
n Mixed Bundling Auctions with Reserve Prices. (With Tuomas Sandholm). AAMAS-2012, June, Valencia, Spain. PDF.
u Invited talk at Informs-11, Charlotte, USA.
Using AI techniques to automatically discover theorems in game theory
n Approximating optimal combinatorial auctions for complements using restricted welfare maximization. (with Tuomas Sandholm). In IJCAI-2011, Barcelona, Spain. PDF.
u Invited talk at Informs-2011, Charlotte, USA.
u An earlier version appeared in ACM EC-2011 Workshop on Bayesian Mechanism Design (WBMD), June, 2011, San Jose, CA.
n Computer-aided Theorem Discovery - A New Adventure and its Application to Economic Theory. PhD dissertation, HKUST, 2010. PDF.
Potential games and Super-modular games are best-response equivalent
n A Framework for Quantitative Evaluation of Voting Rules. (With Mike Munie, Yoav Shoham). In Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice 6 (LGS6), 2009. PDF.
n Discovering Theorems in Game Theory: Two-Person Games with Unique Nash Equilibria Payoff. (With Fangzhen Lin). In IJCAI-2009, July, Pasadena, USA. PDF.
n A 3-line proof for Arrows theorem. This paper opens a new direction of mechanical theorem-proving in economics
n 1 If there is a function on N voters and M candidates satisfying Arrows conditions, its restriction on N-1 voters and M candidates can do the same
n 2 If there is a function on N voters and M candidates satisfying Arrows conditions, its restriction on N voters and M-1 candidates can do the same
n 3 I write a program that exhaustively enumerates all the functions on 2 voters and 3 candidates satisfying Arrows condition, it returns nothing. QED
n Team Competition. (With Yoav Shoham and Fangzhen Lin) In AAMAS-2009, May, Budapest, Hungary. PDF
n Computer Aided Proofs of Arrows and Other Impossibility Theorems. (With Fangzhen Lin) In AAAI-2008, July, Chicago, USA. PDF
n Computer-Aided Proofs of Theorems in Implementation Theory. (With Fangzhen Lin) Working paper. PDF
n Two-person Bridge. (With Yiling Chen) Working paper. Students