Settling the Efficiency of First Price Auction

演讲人: Yaonan Jin 华为TCS实验室
时间: 2023-12-11 14:00-2023-12-11 15:00
地点:FIT 1-222

We prove that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS) of First Price Auctions are both 1−1/e2 ~= 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].

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Yaonan Jin is a full-time researcher at the Huawei TCS Lab. His research interests encompass Theoretical Computer Science, with an emphasis on Algorithmic Economics. Before joining Huawei, he obtained his PhD from Columbia University in 2023, advised by Prof. Xi Chen and Prof. Rocco Servedio. Before that, he obtained his MPhil from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in 2019 and his BEng from Shanghai Jiao Tong University in 2017.